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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was made for ABB Oy, Distribution Solutions unit. It is made to im-
prove the self-testing properties of an embedded device- 
 Some of the embedded devices have been returned to the manufacturer due to dif-
ferent faults, such as Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), bus, memory, real-time clock, 
transistor or other small component faults. This thesis is about memory testing to 
spot defective Random-Access Memory (RAM) chips. 
The microprocessors used in the embedded devices (MPC8247) do not have enough 
internal RAM for normal operation, so external RAM must be supplied. There are 
two different RAM chips attached to the Central Processing Unit (CPU) module 
that is being tested and the goal is to find which RAM chip causes the error and the 
error bits and their memory address. With this information it would be possible to 
prove if the memory Integrated Circuit (IC) vendor sells defective chips or if the 
memory faults are caused in the production. 
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2 COMPUTER MEMORY 
In computer sciences memory refers to the hardware IC that store information for 
immediate use. Memory types are divided into two categories, volatile and non-
volatile. Understanding the differences between memory types creates basic under-
standing of computer memory used later in this document. /1/ 
2.1 Non-volatile Memories 
Non-volatile memory (NVM) retrieves information after it has been power cycled, 
whereas volatile memory does not. Examples of NVM are flash memory, Read-
Only Memory (ROM), Non-Volatile Random-Access Memory (NVRAM), hard 
disks, floppy disks and optical disks. /1/ 
Flash memory is an electronic non-volatile computer memory. Writing to flash 
memory is done in pages and the page size depends on the flash memory architec-
ture and manufacturer. Before flash memory can be written, it must be first erased, 
and it is done in sectors (or blocks). The downside of flash memory is its limited 
write cycles of 1,000 to 100,000 times. /1/ 
Flash memories typically store information in memory cells made from floating 
gate transistors. Two tin oxide layer separated transistors are knowns as a Floating 
Gate (FG) and Control Gate (CG). FG’s link to word line is through the control 
gate. If the link is in place, the cells value is 1. See Figure 1 for illustration of a flash 
memory cell. To erase data stored in flash, elevated voltage is used to discharge the 
floating gate, by Fowler-Nordheim tunneling (Quantum-mechanical phenomenon 
in which an electron with insufficient energy to overcome the barrier of the gate 
insulator can appear on the other side). Reading and writing the cell depends on the 
flash memory types; NAND and NOR. /3/ 
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Figure 1. A flash memory cell. /1/ 
In NOR flash, each end of the memory cell is connected to the source line and the 
other end directly to a bit line resembling a NOR gate (see Figure 2). The storage 
transistors are in parallel, so reading out is done by gating off all expect the selected 
transistor. The flash cell is reset with the use of Fowler-Nordheim tunneling. NOR-
type flash allows a single word to be written or read from location. NOR flash is 
used in embedded applications because of its low read latencies and because it al-
lows for both code execution and data storage in a single memory product. /3/ 
Figure 2. NOR flash structure. /3/ 
In NAND flash the memory cells are connected in series to form a NAND gate (see 
Figure 3). Transistors are connected in series and reading out is done by holding 
HIGH all gates but the selected transistor. This selected transistor then resolves the 
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conduction of the series string based on the charge on its floating gate. To write 
flash, NAND flash uses tunnel injection method and for erasing tunnel release is 
used. NAND flash memory must be erased, written and read in pages. /2/ NAND 
flash is typically deployed in USB flash drives, memory cards and solid-state 
drives. /3/ 
Figure 3. NAND flash structure. /3/ 
2.2 Volatile Memories 
Computer systems expect a random-access memory out of which they operate. In 
modern software the code and data reside in the same place. Instruction and data 
requests go to this place, the memory. At any random time, any data could be 
needed by the microprocessor. The program code does not have to be next to the 
data that it manipulates. Code or more specifically instructions executed sequen-
tially do not have to be next to each other in the memory either. This is how the 
name Random-Access Memory was originated. Modern volatile memories are Dy-
namic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) and Static Random-Access Memory 
(SRAM).  /1/ 
2.2.1 SRAM 
SRAM is typically less common nowadays due to its cost. It is mainly used in mi-
croprocessor cache because of its superior performance over other memory struc-
tures like DRAM. SRAM also uses the same fabrication process as the micropro-
cessors core making the integration of cache onto the processor die less complex. 
/1/ 
13 
A memory cell (MC) is implemented as two cross-coupled inverters accessed using 
two pass transistors. The cross-coupled connection creates an infinite loop that al-
lows single bit of data to be stored indefinitely. Asserting a word line and detecting 
the differential voltage between the bit line pair is used to read the bit. To write a 
bit, the bit line must be driven with differential voltage from an external source to 
write data onto the memory cell. See Figure 4 below for 6 transistor SRAM cell. /1/ 
Figure 4. Basic six-transistor SRAM cell. /3/ 
Address decoding is a process of receiving address and giving signals to initiate and 
complete the operation on the addressed location. It involves feeding an address 
value into a binary decoder and using the output to activate the correct word line of 
address’s memory cells. /1/ 
Memory arrays (such as SRAM and DRAM) usually employ two-dimensional de-
coding, where a part of the address accesses a single row of the array and the other 
part is used to select a fraction of all the columns within accessed row. /1/ 
Traditionally SRAM did not need clocking input, it was asynchronous. To read or 
write data only address, data and control signals with proper timing needed to be 
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applied. Reading data is a simple process (see Figure 5): the address, Chip Enable 
(CE’), and Output Enable (OE’) are asserted. The single quotation mark and 
overline indicate active LOW signal. This makes the data appear on the data lines 
after specified time. Writing a word (see Figure 6) is done in a similar manner: 
address, data and CE are asserted. After specified time Write Enable (WE’) pulse 
is sent. This results in valid data latched into memory at end of the WE’ pulse. 
Asynchronous SRAM is a good choice for microprocessors internal cache. /3/ 
 
Figure 5. Asynchronous SRAM read cycle. /3/ 
The clocked version of SRAM is called synchronous SRAM. Because of the clock-
ing, the speed of the synchronous SRAM is given as a maximum frequency. Syn-
chronous SRAM is a lot more complicated than its asynchronous version. It sup-
ports double-data transfer using LOW and HIGH clock edges, bursting and inter-
leaving data. It is an ideal candidate for microprocessors external cache. See Figure 
7 for Synchronous SRAM timing with double data-rate (DDR-2) clocking during 
read and write operations. /3/ 
2.2.2 DRAM 
DRAM is the “computer memory”, because it’s the cheapest and takes least amount 
of physical space. The DRAM device is typically connected to the CPU indirectly 
through a memory controller. Because DRAM is almost always guaranteed to be 
15 
an external device, there are some issues that a designer must consider: pins (their 
capacitance and inductance), signalling, signal integrity, packaging, clocking and 
synchronization, timing conventions. Omitting these concerns results in suboptimal 
or possibly non-functional design. /1/ 
 
Figure 6. Asynchronous SRAM write cycle. /3/ 
DRAM uses a single transistor-capacitor pair for each bit (see Figure 8). This 
memory type is dynamic, because capacitors are used to store electrons and the 
capacitors leakage requires each capacitor in the memory array to be periodically 
refreshed. DRAM die contains multiple memory arrays, rectangular grids of storage 
cells with each cell holding one bit of data. A memory controller is used to access 
(read or write) a storage cell inside a DRAM chip by specifying a row address and 
a column address to the DRAM. /1/ 
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Figure 7. Synchronous SRAM read and write operations. /3/ 
Memory arrays within the memory chip can operate in different ways for example 
in unison, independently or combination of the previous ways. When the memory 
arrays operate as unison, they act as a unit and the memory chip usually transmits 
or receives a number of bits equal to the number of arrays every time the memory 
controller accesses the memory. To give a simple example, a x32 DRAM indicates 
that the DRAM has at least 32 memory arrays and column width is 32 bits. Those 
32 arrays would each read 1 data bit in unison and the x32 DRAM sends out 32 
data bits every time the memory controller makes a column read request. Each in-
dependently operating memory array group is called a bank. Banks are independent 
of each other; they can be activated, precharged and read at the same time other 
banks are being activated, precharged, read out, etc. See Figure 9 for DRAM array. 
/1/ 
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Figure 8. Basic one-transistor, one-capacitor DRAM cell. /3/ 
Asynchronous DRAM performs a read cycle by first asserting Row-Address Strobe 
(RAS’) multiplexed address lines with two high-order address bits. This causes the 
bits to latch, setting the row gates HIGH, which turns on the Metal-Oxide-Semi-
conductor Field-Effect Transistor (MOSFET) transmission gates, which results in 
coupling the respective capacitors to the column Sense Amplifier (SA’). The sense 
amplifiers in each column latch into the state of the bits that were held in the cells 
of the selected row and refresh those cells by asserting their latched level back onto 
the respective cell capacitors. Next, the two low-order address bits get carried by 
address lines and those address bits are latched by the Column-Address Strobe 
(CAS’). The column multiplexer selects the output from the selected SA. Because 
WE’ is disasserted, this output is asserted onto the I/O data line. As this is asyn-
chronous memory, the data appears on the data lines in a guaranteed time. There is 
no master clock in asynchronous DRAM. See Figure 10 for asynchronous DRAM 
timing. /3/ 
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Figure 9. 2x DRAM array. /1/ 
Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM) is the master clocked brother of asynchronous 
DRAM. The clock transition in synchronous devices is used to load the row and 
columns addresses and to clock data in and out (read and write operations). SDRAM 
is typically operated in burst mode; multiple data words from consecutive column 
addresses clocked out in sequence. SDRAM and its asynchronous brother use the 
same input signal bits, RAS’, CAS’ and WE’, which determine what happens on 
the next clocking edge. There is also several clock cycle delay from the assertion 
of the column address to the corresponding data, also called CL (CAS latency). The 
chip needs to know the used CL, it must be sent on a clock cycle RAS’, CAS’, WE’ 
held LOW and the defined mode on the address lines. Some SDRAM varieties also 
have a clock latency during write cycle, also known as WL (Write Latency). WL 
occurs after the column address is clocked in. See Figure 11 for illustration of 
SDRAM which uses an external interface whose operations are synchronized by an 
externally applied clock. /3/ 
DRAM has other commands in addition of read and write: activate, refresh and 
precharge. The activate command is the row access command, its purpose is to 
move data from the cells in the DRAM array to the sense amplifiers and then restore 
the data back into the DRAM array cells. The time it takes for the activate command 
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to move data from the cell arrays to the sense amplifiers is the Row Column Delay, 
tRCD. After the time tRCD from the assertion of the row access command, the row of 
activated data is held in the sense amplifiers. Subsequent column read/write com-
mands can then move data between memory controller and the sense amplifiers. 
Next the data has to be restored back to the DRAM cells. tRAS, Row Access Strobe 
latency, is the time it takes for an activate command to discharge and restore the 
data in the memory cells. After the tRAS from the assertion of the active command, 
the sense amplifiers have completed data restoration and they can then precharge 
for another activate to a different row in the same bank. /1/ 
 
Figure 10. Asynchronous DRAM timing. /3/ 
Data access in DRAM consist of a two-step process. An activate command moves 
data from the DRAM array to the sense amplifier array. After a data row is moved 
into the sense amplifiers, that data is cached by the sense amplifiers for subsequent 
column access commands to move the data between the DRAM and the memory 
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controller. The precharge command completes the sequence of row access as it reset 
the bit lines and the sense amplifiers and prepares them for the next row access. /1/ 
 
Figure 11. SDRAM timing. RAS’, CAS’, WE’ used as a 3-bit command. /3/ 
As DRAM is dynamic, the electrical charge stored in the storage capacitors, the 
memory cells, will leak out through the transistors. To main data integrity, the 
memory cells have to periodically read out and restored to full voltage level before 
the stored electrical charges decay. The refresh command handles maintained the 
data integrity. As long as the time interval between the refresh commands made to 
a row of DRAM array is shorter than the worst-case data decay time, data integrity 
is ensured. More frequency refreshing consumes more power and available band-
width. Most DRAM devices use a refresh row address register to keep track of the 
address of the previously refreshed row. Usually it is the Memory Controller that 
sends a single refresh command to the DRAM device, and the DRAM device in-
crements the address in the refresh row address register and refreshes the selected 
row in all the memory banks. The refresh command consists of other commands in 
the specified order: activate, precharge, activate and precharge. /1/ 
Errors in DRAM devices have been a concern for a long time. A memory error is 
an event that leads to the logical state of one or multiple bits being read differently 
from how they were last written. Memory errors can be caused by electrical or 
magnetic interference, by problems with the hardware or caused by the result of 
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corruption along the data path between the memory and the processor. The 
consequence of a memory error depends on the systems. Systems without support 
for error correction and detection, a memory error can lead to applications using 
corrupted data or a machine crash. Employing Error Correcting Code (ECC) allows 
the detection and correction of one or multiple bit errors. Uncorrectable errors, such 
as too many affected bits, can lead to a forced machine shutdown. /17/ 
2.3 Memory Controller 
In today’s computer systems processors and I/O devices access data in the memory 
using memory controller. The memory controller is a digital circuit that manages 
the flow of data between the microprocessor and external memory circuit. It con-
tains the logic to read and write data to DRAM and refresh the data at set intervals. 
See Figure 12 for illustration of memory controller. The memory controller handles 
reading and writing by selecting row and column data addresses of the DRAM as 
the inputs to the multiplexer circuit. /1/ 
  
22 
Figure 12. Simplified illustration of the Memory Controller in MPC8247. /5/ 
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3  MEMORY FAULT MODELS 
The purpose of memory design and test is to produce good memories and to deliver 
them to the customers. The goal of designing a memory is to result in a robust circuit 
and when the memory is tested the circuit is examined for manufacturing defects. 
/2/ 
The whole purpose of testing is to detect manufacturing defects. Characterization 
means examining the margins of a design and performing design verification. It 
looks at the marginality with respect to the voltage, timing, temperature and other 
environmental conditions. This is done to verify that the design is a good design. 
As a chip design is fabricated, it must be characterized to ensure for its robustness 
and that the design functions correctly. /2/ 
A fault model is a description of the way something can fail and there are numerous 
fault models that are applicable to memories. These memory fault models are de-
scribed via the Markov diagram. Figure 13 shows a Markov diagram of a fault free 
memory cell. “R” describing a read operation, W0 describing a write “0” operation 
and W1 respectively a write “1” operation. S0 and S1 are used to indicate the cell 
state. /2/ 
 
Figure 13. A fault free memory cell. 
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3.1 Single Cell Faults 
The most common memory fault model, Stuck-at Fault (SAF), indicates that a cell 
is locked to in one state or another. Figure 14 shows a Markov diagram of a SAF in 
a memory. /2/ 
 
Figure 14. A Stuck-at Fault cell. 
A Stuck Open Fault (SOF) means that the memory word cannot be accessed, be-
cause when the SA contains a latch during a read operation the previously read 
value may be returned. This fault can be modelled as SAF if the different amplifier 
behaves as a buffer. 
A Transition Fault (TF) model looks like a Stuck-at Fault, except the memory cell 
will retain either state, “1” or “0”. After it is written to one state it cannot transition 
back to the previous state. Figure 15 shows a Markov diagram of the Transition 
Fault. /2/ 
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Figure 15. A Transition Fault. 
A Read Destructive Fault (RDF) occurs when a read operation is performed to the 
cell causing an inversion of the value and returns an incorrect value. It can occur 
when cell is “1” or “0”. See Figure 16 for illustration when “0” is read from the 
memory cell flipping the memory cell value to “1”. /2/ 
 
Figure 16. A Read Destructive Fault. 
A Deceptive Read Destructive Fault (DRDF) occurs when a read operation is per-
formed to the memory cell causing inversion of the cell value but returning the 
correct value. See Figure 17 for DRDF when a memory cell in state “0” is read, “0” 
turns in to “1” but returns “0”. /6/ 
26 
 
Figure 17. A Deceptive Read Destructive Fault. 
A Write Destructive Fault (WDF) occurs when a write operation is performed to 
the cell causing the memory cell to flip. It can occur when the cell state is “1” or 
“0”. See Figure 18 for illustration when “0” is written on memory cells value “0”, 
resulting in the memory cell turning to “1”. /2/ 
 
Figure 18. A Write Destructive Fault. 
3.2 Multiple Cell Faults 
There are multiple types of Coupling Faults (CF) models. To simply describe Cou-
pling Fault (CF) models, a cell can couple into its neighbour cell thus causing it to 
falsely transition or to go to erroneous state. Two detect free cells are illustrated 
below in Figure 19. /2/ 
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Figure 19. A pair of detect free cells. 
Unidirectional coupling, where one call can couple into another cell without the 
opposite happening, is also possible. The cell doing the coupling is referred to as 
the aggressor cell and the cell that transitions is called the victim cell. The aggressor 
cell appears to operate correctly but the victim cells turns to incorrect state. This 
type of detect usually occurs when a parasitic diode, which is connected by a defect 
diode, is pulled high. On reverse operation the victim to aggress diode connection 
is reversed biased resulting in no transition in the aggressor cell. A bidirectional 
defect caused by a bridging defect can cause this reverse operation to occur. See 
Figure 20 for illustration. /2/ 
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Figure 20. A coupling fault. 
In the Neighbourhood Pattern Sensitive Fault (NPSF) model a memory cell is de-
pendent upon the cells in its neighbourhood. Usually memories are described in 
terms of a nine-cell neighbourhood (see Figure 21). The base cell in the centre is 
surrounded by eight cells and it could be dependent on all or some of the neigh-
bouring cells. The neighbourhood is the base cell plus those around it that can affect 
its behaviour. /2/ 
 
Figure 21. A nine-cell neighbourhood. 
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4 ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY 
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) is a serious and increasing form of environ-
mental pollution. Its effects range from minor annoyances such as crackles on 
broadcast reception to potentially fatal accidents due to corruption of safety-critical 
control systems. EMI can cause electrical and electronic malfunctions, can prevent 
the use of the radio frequency spectrum, can ignite flammable substance atmos-
phere or can even have a direct effect on human tissue. /8/ 
4.1 System Defect 
The use of microprocessors has stimulated the upsurge of interest in Electromag-
netic Compatibility (EMC). Microprocessors are widely responsible for generating 
radio frequency interference and are susceptible to many interfering phenomena. 
Also, the widespread replacement of metal chassis by plastic enclosures has signif-
icantly reduced the protection offered to circuits by their housings. /8/ 
Processor-based control systems have taken over many functions which were ear-
lier dominated by electromechanical or analogue equipment such as relay logic. 
Rather than being hard-wired to perform a particular task, microprocessors rely on 
a digital bus-linked architecture in which many signals are multiplexed onto a single 
hardware bus under software control. This structure exposes the systems to inter-
ference, because of the low level of energy needed to change state, but the effects 
of interference are impossible to predict. Even a random pulse could corrupt the 
operation depending on its timing with respect to the internal clock. Continuous 
interference usually has no effect on the programs state as long as it remains below 
the logic level threshold, but the systems operation will be disrupted as the interfer-
ence crosses the threshold. /8/ 
4.2 Electromagnetic Phenomena 
The electromagnetic phenomena which can be expected to interfere with control 
systems are supply voltage disruptions, dips, surges and fluctuations, transient over-
voltage on a supply, signal and control lines, radio frequency fields, electrostatic 
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discharge (ESD) and low frequency magnetic of electric fields. ESD is mainly prob-
lem in electronic production, because once the components are assembled into a 
unit, they are protected from it. But it must be kept in mind that an ESD transient 
can corrupt the operation of a microprocessor just as a transient coupled into the 
supply signal or signal ports can, without damaging the components. /8/ 
It is not always clear whether the system malfunctions due to faulty software or due 
to EMI. This problem is highlighted when handling real time systems; the transient 
coincidences of external conditions with critical software execution state can cause 
operational failure which is almost or completely impossible to replicate. The 
symptoms, system crashes, incorrect operations or faulty data, can be identical to 
those induced by EMI. Sometimes the only way to distinguish faulty software from 
poor EMC may be by characterizing the environment in which the system is run. 
/8/ 
4.3 Memory Corruption 
Memory fault is one of the most common hardware causes for machine crashes in 
today’s datacenters. To design, evaluate and model systems that are resilient against 
memory errors require a good understanding of the underlying characteristics of 
errors in DRAM. As the number of DRAM in servers keeps growing and chip den-
sities increase, DRAM errors pose an even bigger threat to the reliability of future 
generations of systems. /9/ 
Noise induced by transient can damage memories such as RAM or flash due to them 
interfering with clock circuits or flash write voltages. Corrupted memory can be 
manifested as flash checksum error or the system can lose a functionality because 
of corrupted code or data in flash or RAM. Flash corruption can be permanent, or 
it can require power cycle or reprogramming to recover the default state. RAM cor-
ruption might require a power cycle or a reset to resume the systems normal opera-
tion. /7/ 
Subsystem failure can be temporary or permanent. Permanent damage is easy to 
detect, whereas temporary damage such as latch-up or memory corruption can be 
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recovered to normal operation state by power cycling the equipment. When the sub-
system is subjected to an EFT (Electrical Fast Transients), it can be partially dam-
aged while still being fully functional, but when stressed with by a power supply, 
high temperature or abnormal operating conditions, the damaged component can 
then fail permanently. This effect is usually hard to identify and solve. /7/ 
4.1 Soft Errors 
The energetic-proton component of galactic cosmic rays can be the cause of anom-
alous bit errors observed in memory chips in satellites. The dominant two radiation 
sources that cause soft errors, also known as single-event-upsets (SEU), in IC’s are 
alpha particles and cosmic neutrons. In soft error, the data is corrupted the device 
itself is not damaged. The density of circuit on chips has reached the point where a 
subatomic particle can upset the information stored in a memory cell. Even 
multiple-bit SER is possible as the density of the circuits keeps increasing. /10/, 
/13/, /14/, /15/  
The manufacturers of DRAM memories have been forced to incorporate three-
dimensional structures into their cell designs to save area. At least three different 
approaches to cell technology for storing the bit charge have been adopted:  a trench 
with internal charge (TIC), a trench with external charge (TEC) and the stacked 
capacitor (SC). A total of 26 different memory chip types were evaluated for cosmic 
ray soft fail rate in a study (Ziegler, J., IEEE, Nelson, M., Shell, J., Peterson, J., 
Gerderloos, Carl., Muhfeld, Hans. & Montrose, C). The chips represented the three 
different cell technologies and the final Soft Error Rate of the chips showed that 
there appears to be a strong correlation between the cell design and the SER 
sensitivity with TEC cells being the most sensitive, TIC cell beings about 1500 
times less sensitive. and the SC design appearing to be intermediate sensitive to 
cosmic rays. /12/ 
The cosmic radiation includes gamma ray photons, protons and heavier atomic nu-
clei. The nuclear particles have billions of electron volts of kinetic energy and when 
they collide with the nuclei of nitrogen and oxygen atoms in the upper atmosphere, 
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they smash them into energetic charged fragments, which hit other nuclei and cas-
cade in an avalanche of particles down through the atmosphere to surface of the 
Earth. At ground, there is a shower of secondary particles (including high-energy 
neutrons, protons, electrons, muons and gamma rays) and it is the nuclear compo-
nent of this secondary particle flux (neutrons and secondary protons which cause 
the soft errors in the semiconductor memories). When a proton or a neutron with 
kinetic energy greater than the binding energy of a nucleus collides with a silicon 
nucleus in the semiconductor memory, the reaction produces highly ionizing recoils 
and low-Z charged particles (alpha particles and protons). When an ion travels 
through the memory cell, it will interact with the electric circuit by disturbing the 
electrons in the lattice. The ions kinetic energy is then converted into electron/hole 
pairs along its track as it comes to a stop in the semiconductor and the resulting 
charge moves according to the local electric fields and by diffusion. It can then 
generate a transient current pulse in the circuit, which if large enough, will disturb 
the circuit and the information stored in the memory cell will be corrupted. /10/, 
/19/, /20/  
To protect a memory chip from cosmic radiation, it should be located underground, 
or it should be shielded with meter of concrete or equivalent to significantly reduce 
SER. The amount of soft errors increase at higher altitudes and vice versa. /16/, /20/ 
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5 CHOOSING THE TEST APPROACH 
Four different kinds of approaches were considered for the test implementation: 
running the tests through JTAG Technologies’ CoreCommander software, from the 
application mode, the primary or the secondary bootloader. Each approach has its 
advantages and disadvantages and this chapter is about choosing the right approach 
developing the memory tests. 
5.1 The CoreCommander 
The CoreCommander approach seemed to be the best at first, because the software 
makes testing easy. It grants direct access to memory and I/O (input/output) devices 
through its JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) debug interface and Memory and pe-
ripherals can be manipulated without software programming. Theoretically this 
means that only the memory controller and its clock would need to be initialized 
thus simplifying the testing process. This approach would have been the most 
straightforward, but unfortunately the idea was shelved, because the PowerPC mi-
croprocessor used in the embedded device does not support CoreCommander. 
5.2 The Application 
The second idea was to run the tests in the application mode, because all peripherals 
such as clocks, controllers, file system (FS), communication and display interfaces 
are initialized. This idea was discarded, because it forces the developer to familiar-
ize himself with millions of lines of the platforms source code, so the necessary 
modifications could be made without exposing the system to faults. This method 
also restricts the memory addresses CPU (Central Processing Unit) can write to. In 
addition, modifying memory controller options during runtime could lead to unex-
pected behaviour. It would also require comprehensive testing to ensure it is safe 
and reliable to use.  
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5.3 The Secondary Bootloader 
The third approach is called secondary bootloader approach. It seemed to be ideal 
candidate for testing, because peripheral (such as LCD, communications) initiali-
zation takes place there. Test results could be written to LCD display and to the file 
system after they are initialized. This option would not force the developer to fa-
miliarize himself with the platforms source code thus saving time. This approach 
was abandoned as well because the secondary bootloader runs from the RAM. 
5.4 The Primary Bootloader 
The fourth and final option was the primary bootloader. It was avoided, because the 
test result reporting was deemed to be clumsy; the results must be read from the 
CPU registers with a debugger. But it was the only viable option, because primary 
bootloader runs from flash memory allowing unrestricted RAM access. Similarly, 
to bootloader 2 approach, this option allows the developer to ignore most of the 
platforms source code. 
5.5 The Result 
A combination of primary and secondary bootloader approaches was chosen, be-
cause there already are memory tests in the application mode and bootloaders tests 
need more diversity, such as different testing techniques and varying options in the 
memory controller. The test results are also written to the flash memory, so the 
secondary bootloader displays and stores them. This method also streamlines the 
use of this software, because there is no need to use a debugger to read the test 
results. 
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6 DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Freescale CodeWarrior 8 was used to develop the software. It is an IDE (Integrated 
Development Environment) that allows editing the program code, building and de-
bugging. The hardware debugger used was Lauterbach PowerDebug USB 3 with 
an extension cable (bottom right in the Figure 22). It is connected to 16-pin JTAG 
connector and the microprocessor is controlled with the TRACE32 software. 
TRACE32 can stop the execution of the program, step over, step in/out, and access 
memory. 
 
Figure 22. The full setup. 
The CPU module (see Figure 23) is attached to the embedded device. The micro-
processor is located at the centre of the CPU module and RAM at the top right 
corner. The second RAM chip is on other side of the PCB (Printed Circuit Board). 
The other distinct IC’s populated on the PCB are FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate 
Array) on the left and flash memory on the right, below the RAM. 
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Figure 23. The CPU module.  
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7 FAULT RECORDING 
Memory tests are run during the primary bootloader, which does not have access to 
LCD or FS. To record faults, a workaround was needed; log faults in to flash 
memory, so any further RAM tests would not corrupt the results. 
7.1 Writing and Erasing the Flash 
The microprocessor is configured to execute from external NOR flash ISSI 
IS29GL256. The device datasheet states that the flash memory must be in read 
mode, so it can be read /4/. Otherwise it would result in corrupt operational code 
(opcodes) when the CPU executes from it. As workaround, part of a subroutine 
responsible of writing the flash is executed from the Instruction Cache. The Instruc-
tion Cache loads 8 instructions (instruction size is 32 bits) from flash at once, so the 
code after the flash write is 8 word aligned by placing the function at static memory 
address with the use of linker script. 
As explained in the Chapter 3, flash memory cannot be rewritten, it must be erased 
first and as mentioned above, the CPU cannot execute from flash while it’s being 
written. The erase function is too big to execute from the cache, so the subroutine 
responsible of erasing the flash sector is copied into a bank in the CPU’s inner dual-
port RAM (DPRAM) and executed from there by manipulating the Instruction 
Pointer register. This dual-port RAM, which is used as a communication buffer, is 
different and a lot smaller than the external RAM. /5/ 
The software occasionally failed to boot to the secondary bootloader, presumably 
because writing the flash memory was still causing problems. Perhaps the absence 
of the delay needed after writing or erasing the flash memory that caused the 
crashes. It was then decided to escape the sunk-cost fallacy trap by developing an 
alternative approach. The existing project was studied more to discover that there 
was enough space for test results in DPRAM after all. After these changes the mi-
croprocessor booted successfully. 
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7.2 Timestamp 
The tests are run for determined time. To achieve this, the microprocessor keeps 
track of time with its Time Base register pair TBU:TBL, referred as TB register. 
TB register indicates time since the power-up. The CPU bus clock is configured to 
99 MHz frequency and the TB frequency can be calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝐵 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =
𝐵𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘
4
=
99 𝑀𝐻𝑧
4
= 24,75 𝑀𝐻𝑧   /5/ 
The next step is to calculate time to increment the TB register.  The time base is 
calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 =
1
𝑇𝐵 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
=
1
24,75 𝑀𝐻𝑧
= 40,4 𝑛𝑠   /5/ 
 
To calculate the elapsed time in seconds, the following equation is used: 
 
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 𝑇𝐵 𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑠 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
At compile time the software can be configured to run for 1 to 7 days. Even 
longer test durations, such as weeks or even months, are possible. 
 
7.3 Displaying the Test Results 
After the timeout, short list of the test results can be seen on the LCD. The compre-
hensive list of the test results could be seen in a Hypertext Markup Language 
(HTML) file in the FS. The HTML file describes the tests and lists the results in a 
HTML table element. 
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8 TEST PROCEDURE 
In the test software, the device is designed to be stationed inside hot air oven to 
expose its memory IC’s to possible faults. The test duration is lengthy, because the 
device must be tested in varying temperatures and it can take several weeks or even 
longer for a defect to occur. The source code for the memory tests is included in the 
Appendix 1. 
8.1 Overview 
The test software is written amongst the platforms source code and the memory 
tests are run at the bootloader section during the program startup. The tests begin 
by initializing the CPU and its peripherals. The memory controller needs to be con-
figured (see Chapter 4) for correct RAM and flash memory accesses as well. 
Memory tests are run for a programmed duration in loop and after each loop cycle 
the memory controller is reconfigured. If a fault is found during testing, it is logged 
by writing to free address space in the DPRAM.  
After timeout occurs, the testing exits and the device boots to the secondary boot-
loader mode.  The secondary bootloader reads the test results from the DPRAM and 
writes them into the devices FS and LCD. The test results include fault time (sec-
onds from boot), test number, fault address, faulty, expected bits and test specific 
values. See Figure 25 for the flowchart of the program execution. 
The CPU executes the program code from the flash memory, which has very slow 
access times (70 ns for IS29GL128) compared to RAM (~6 ns for IS42S32400F). 
The CPU is bottlenecked by the flash memory access times and it cannot use the 
RAM during the tests, so to speed up the program execution the software loads the 
instructions from a fast SRAM, the Instruction Cache. The CPU fetches two in-
structions from the Instruction Cache each clock cycle to reduce memory access 
times. /1/, /5/, /11/ 
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Figure 24.  The memory test flowchart. 
Optimization techniques such as instruction scheduling, and loop unrolling were 
applied on the hot loops of the memory tests to really stress the memory. Even 
though the microprocessor core has an excellent Branch Processing Unit (BPU), 
even the branching was optimized to ensure that branch shadowing is minimized. 
/5/ 
8.2 Hot Air Oven 
The maximum recommend operating temperature of MPC8247 is 105°C. To 
calculate theoretical maximum temperature for the hot air oven, we need calculate 
ambient temperature TA. RθJA is package junction-to-ambient thermal resistance 
(ºC/W) and PD is thermal dissipation. Normal airflow is expected. 
𝑇𝐴 = 𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 (°C) 
𝑇𝐽 = 105°C 
𝑅𝛉𝐽𝐴 = 21 °
C
W
 
𝑃𝐷 = 2,1𝑊 
𝑇𝐴 = 𝑇𝐽 − (𝑅𝛉𝐽𝐴 × 𝑃𝐷) = 60,9°C 
The theoretical maximum operating temperature for the microprocessor is 60,9°C. 
As pointed earlier in the Chapter 6, the CPU module has other components in 
addition of the MPC8247. Two SDRAM memories, flash memory and other IC’s 
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are included as well and add to the ambient temperature as the module is located 
inside a closed case. /18/ 
8.3 Test Descriptions 
The first test tests for noise when a large number of bits change all at once by writ-
ing 1’s, then 0’s, then 1’s again and reading the value and finally resetting the 
memory back to 0’s. If the results differ from written values, then the memory is 
faulty. All memory the accesses are word size (32-bit). It also tests for Stuck at 
Fault. 
The second test tests for Coupling Faults and Neighbourhood Pattern Sensitive 
Faults by writing to a memory address0 and then reading its neighboring cells 
(memory address). The result should always be 0, else the memory is defective. The 
neighbouring offsets of addresses to test are ±4 and ±1024. The memory is tested 
by writing words. Neighboring row memory addresses are calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝐴𝑀 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 =
256 𝑀𝑏
8
= 32 𝑀𝐵 
𝑅𝑜𝑤𝑠 = 8192 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 = 8 
𝑅𝑜𝑤 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 =  
𝑅𝐴𝑀 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
𝑅𝑜𝑤𝑠
= 1024 𝐵 
The third test tests for Write Destructive Faults by performing transitioning write, 
then performing non-transitioning write and finally reading the result. If the value 
read is invalid, it means the memory cell value was flipped during a write operation. 
This test is performed with both writing 1’s and 0’s. All memory accesses are word 
size in this test. 
The fourth test, tests for Read Destructive Faults by setting a value, then performing 
the first and then the second read. If the result is invalid, it means that the first read 
operation caused inversion of the cell value. Memory accesses are word size in this 
test. 
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The fifth test is a simple test. It aims to test that memory holds the values long 
enough. This test excels when modifying the memory controller values (refresh 
rate, for example). It is done by filling memory with values, then reading the values. 
If the read results do not match to written values, then the memory is deemed faulty. 
The test is performed using word size memory accesses. 
The sixth test tests the memory by writing alternating bit patterns, first writing 
0x555 type pattern, reading it, writing 0xAAA type pattern, reading again and then 
verifying the results. 
The seventh test writes memory with large number of alternating bits, toggling the 
bits and writing again and finally toggling back and writing. The memory is faulty 
if the read result doesn’t match the last write. Memory accesses are word size in 
this test. 
The eight test writes the memory with unique byte size values and then verifies 
them. The write begins from value 0x40 and decrements by one after each write. 
When the test value reaches 0x00, it rolls over and continues from 0xFF.  
The ninth test writes the memory with unique halfword (16-bit) size values and then 
verifies them. The write begins from value 0x8000 and decrements by one after 
each write. When the test value reaches 0x00, it rolls over and continues from 
0xFFFF. 
8.1 Reconfiguring the Memory Controller 
The memory controller is configured to use specific values at boot time. By rotating 
different options in the SDRAM Mode Register, it is possible to expose the RAM 
to failure. The purpose of this is to modify wait state durations and clock cycle 
counts to find out whether the RAM chip exceeds the limits or not. Reconfigurable 
values are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Reconfigurable values for SDRAM Mode Register (PSDMR). /5/ 
Name Description Timing 
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RFRC Refresh recovery defines the earliest tim-
ing for an activate command after a refresh 
command. 
5 clock cycles 
PRETOACT Precharge to activate interval defines the 
earliest timing for activate/refresh com-
mand after an activate command. 
1...8 clock cycles 
ACTTORW Activate to read/write interval, which de-
fines the earliest timing for read/write 
command after an activate command. 
2...8 clock cycles 
LDOTOPRE Last data out to precharge defines the ear-
liest timing for precharge command after 
the last data was written to SDRAM. 
0...2 clock cycles 
WRC Write recovery time set the earliest timing 
for precharge command after the last data 
was written to the SDRAM. 
1...4 clock cycles 
 
All RAM tests are run by setting each register fields value to the minimum, and the 
maximum then resetting back to the default state one by one and by setting the 
register fields all at once. The memory tests are also run when the memory control-
ler is in its default state. The default state in this context means the state, where the 
device is configured to operate when it is deployed. 
The Memory Controller also possesses registers to manipulate the refresh timer pe-
riod: 60x Bus-Assigned SDRAM Refresh Timer (PSRT) and Memory Refresh 
Timer Prescaler Register (MPTPR). Each PSDMR configuration is ran with three 
different refresh timer intervals: the default, minimum and maximum. The formula 
to calculate the refresh timer period is listed below. 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 =  
(𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑇 + 1) × (𝑀𝑃𝑇𝑃𝑅 → 𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 1)
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
  /5/ 
The following equation is used to set the lowest refresh interval: 
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=
2 × 3
99 𝑀𝐻𝑧
= 606 𝑛𝑠       
To set the highest refresh interval, the following equation is used: 
=
256 × 256
99 𝑀𝐻𝑧
= 662 𝜇𝑠       
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9 ANALYSIS OF THE TEST RESULTS 
The software was tested by running it for varying durations and with different CPU 
modules. A valid CPU module was tested multiple times to ensure that the software 
does not pick up false positives and all the tests were performed without hot air 
oven. The test results are included in the Appendix 2. 
9.1 CPU Module 1 
By looking at the tests results in Table 2, one can notice that the three least signifi-
cant hexadecimal digits are always the same in the address column. It must also be 
noted that the result bits differ from the expected bits by 1 hexadecimal digit. In 
hexadecimal notation “F” equals to a nibble (a four-bit aggregation) “1111” when 
converted to binary and “B” equals to a nibble “1011” in binary. This information 
suggests that a bit line could be broken in one of the memory banks. 
Two memory IC’s are mapped to the microprocessor’s memory and each memory 
circuit has 4 banks. The total memory in hexadecimal presentation is 0x02000000, 
so it has to be divided by 8 to get a bank size of 0x400000. As it can be seen from 
the test results, all memory faults occurred between 0x01600000 and 0x02000000, 
which effectively reveals that only a single memory bank is defective. /11/ 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 = 1 𝑀𝑏 × 32 × 8 = 256 𝑀𝑏 = 32 𝑀𝐵 = 0𝑥02000000 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 =
32 𝑀𝐵
8
= 4 𝑀𝐵 = 0𝑥400000 
The memory errors were only caught by RAM Test 5, which was described in Chap-
ter 8.2. As the values are not held in the cell long enough, the problem is in the 
memory’s refresh controller logic or the microprocessors Memory Controller. The 
refresh controller of the memory handles refreshing all the memory banks, so it is 
possible that a latch or a line between the memory and the refresh controller is bro-
ken causing the failures. Another odd phenomenon is that the memory faults are not 
guaranteed to occur, but when they occur multiple faults appear. /11/ 
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The defects occurred when RFRC parameter was set to 5, which translates to send-
ing activate command 5 clock cycles after the refresh command. It could mean that 
the refresh operation is in process when the activate command is sent and some 
cells could be uncharged. 
It is hard to decipher if the problem is the bit line, the memory’s refresh logic, the 
microprocessor or the combination of the previous possibilities. To further narrow 
down the possibilities, swapping out the memory or the microprocessor would rule 
out the possibility of defective microprocessor. The final step in this investigation 
would be to open the memory IC and inspect it with microscope to validate findings, 
but it is not necessary as the defective memory can now be sent back to the manu-
facturer for further investigation. 
9.2 CPU Module 2 
When the software was run on the CPU module 2, the defects always occurred in 
10 minutes of the boot and the test result area in DPRAM was filled before timeout. 
The truncated test results are visible in Table 3. 
Some of the fault addresses were different between boot ups, but the faulty bit was 
exactly the same and the three least significant hexadecimals were always the same 
on the fault address. The same analysis as in the previous chapter about the address 
and the bit line applies here as well. 
The faults occurred when the PRETOACT or LDOTOPRE parameter was modi-
fied. No faults were found when the same test was run, but with modified Refresh 
Recovery parameter. The PRETOACT parameter modifies the timing for activate 
or refresh command after the precharge command and the LDOTOPRE parameter 
in turn defines the earliest timing for the precharge command after the last data was 
read from the memory. The parameters are linked to the same command, so it is 
natural that both expose faults of the defect memory chip. 
The software found faults from the memory, but the memory addresses were always 
different. The fault addresses expanded across two memory banks, which could 
signal about malfunction with the refresh command. The fault could reside in either 
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the microprocessor or the memory chip and the next step would be to replace one 
of them. 
9.3 CPU Module 3 
CPU Module 3 was tested for 7 days and only two memory faults were detected. 
Both faults occurred at the same memory address and bit. The second fault occurred 
around 16 hours after the first one. To confirm the test results, the test should be 
rerun to see if defects still occur at the same memory location. The test results are 
visible in Table 4. 
9.4 CPU Module 4 
CPU Module 4 was tested for 7 days as well. 67 defects were found in total and 
truncated list of the test results are listed in Table 5. 
Two least significant hexadecimal digits in the address were identical in all the test 
results and the same memory addresses repeat in the test results over the 7-day 
period. It should be noted that the functionality of the tests eight and nine is the 
same only difference being the memory access width, yet only the byte size memory 
access test caught the defects. The test should be rerun to confirm the test results. 
The software provides strong evidence that the RAM is faulty as the fault occurs 
multiple times at the same addresses, yet even better, at the same bit. 
 
48 
10 CONCLUSIONS 
The primary aim of this project was to implement testing software for ABB Oy 
Distribution Solutions Product Quality department, and this was clearly fulfilled as 
the software finds faults as designed. The useability of this project in customer 
product version is limited as updating the primary bootloader via remote means is 
too complicated for the device operators, so the software cannot reliably be distrib-
uted to deployed products. 
However, there are further improvement ideas. The Product Quality department 
would benefit from solving the problem mentioned above as it would verify 
whether the memory is valid or not without sending it back to the factory. Secondly, 
the project could also be improved by implementing more tests as needed. In addi-
tion, the tests results could be logged in .csv format, so they could be opened in 
Microsoft Excel. Finally, the software is portable between the same family micro-
processor cores, so in theory it could be expanded to other product versions.  
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Table 2. CPU module 1 24-hour test results. 
ID Chip Address Bits Expected Notes Timestamp 
5 Upper 0x01CB7A60 0xFFFFFFFB 0xFFFFFFFF Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Refresh Recovery (RFRC) 5 clock cycles. 
0h 12m 19s from boot. 
5 Upper 0x01DB7A60 0xFFFFFFFB 0xFFFFFFFF Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Refresh Recovery (RFRC) 5 clock cycles. 
1h 45m 38s from boot. 
5 Upper 0x01CC7A60 0xFFFFFFFB 0xFFFFFFFF Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Refresh Recovery (RFRC) 5 clock cycles. 
1h 52m 49s from boot. 
5 Upper 0x01D47A60 0xFFFFFFFB 0xFFFFFFFF Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Refresh Recovery (RFRC) 5 clock cycles. 
1h 52m 49s from boot. 
5 Upper 0x01FF7A60 0xFFFFFFFB 0xFFFFFFFF Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Refresh Recovery (RFRC) 5 clock cycles. 
2h 21m 32s from boot. 
5 Upper 0x01C01A60 0xFFFFFFFB 0xFFFFFFFF Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Refresh Recovery (RFRC) 5 clock cycles. 
2h 28m 42s from boot. 
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Table 3. CPU module 2 test results. 
ID Chip Address Bits Expected Notes Timestamp 
5 Lower 0x00FE99C4 0xFFFFFFBF 0xFFFFFFFF 
Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Precharge To Activate interval (PRETOACT) 8 
clock cycles. 
0h 5m 11s from boot. 
5 Lower 0x008099C4 0xFFFFFFBF 0xFFFFFFFF 
Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Precharge To Activate interval (PRETOACT) 8 
clock cycles. 
0h 5m 12s from boot. 
5 Lower 0x00FF99C4 0xFFFFFFBF 0xFFFFFFFF 
Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Last Data Out To Precharge (LDOTOPRE) 0 clock 
cycles. 
0h 5m 45s from boot. 
5 Lower 0x00E919C4 0xFFFFFFBF 0xFFFFFFFF 
Refresh Timer refresh period 606 ns (minimum). 
Last Data Out To Precharge (LDOTOPRE) 0 clock 
cycles. 
0h 5m 45s from boot. 
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Table 4. CPU module 3 7-day test results. 
ID Chip Address Bits Expected Notes Timestamp 
2 Lower 0x006F0B70 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address: 0x006F0770 
Neighbour bits: 0x00200000 
56h 13m 18s from boot. 
2 Lower 0x006F0B70 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address: 0x006F0770 
Neighbour bits: 0x00200000 
71h 52m 23s from boot. 
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Table 5. CPU module 4 7-day test results. 
ID Chip Address Bits Expected Notes Timestamp 
2 Lower 0x00AB3D14 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address 0x00AB3914 
Neighbour bits 0x08000000 
0h 3m 57s from boot. 
2 Lower 0x008D9D14 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address 0x008D9914 
Neighbour bits 0x08000000 
0h 21m 31s from boot. 
8 Lower 0x008FF914 0x0000005D 0x00000055 - 0h 25m 46s from boot. 
2 Lower 0x00AE7D14 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address 0x00AE7914 
Neighbour bits 0x08000000 
3h 4m 51s from boot. 
8 Lower 0x00B2F914 0x0000005D 0x00000055 - 14h 4m 14s from boot. 
2 Lower 0x008D9D14 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address 0x008D9914 
Neighbour bits 0x08000000 
42h 8m 38s from boot. 
8 Lower 0x008FF914 0x0000005D 0x00000055 - 61h 1m 30s from boot. 
2 Lower 0x008D9D14 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address 0x008D9914 
Neighbour bits 0x08000000 
66h 16m 2s from boot. 
8 Lower 0x008FF914 0x0000005D 0x00000055 - 90h 10m 27s from boot. 
2 Lower 0x008D9D14 0x00000001 0x00000000 
Neighbour address 0x008D9914 
Neighbour bits 0x08000000 
95h 24m 59s from boot. 
 
 
